UA-69458566-1

Friday, April 26, 2024

Iran Update, April 26, 2024

Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Christina Harward, Liam Karr, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

Public meetings between officials from Russia, Belarus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea have surged in recent days, with at least 10 high-level bilateral meetings between April 22 and 26, underscoring the deepening multilateral partnership these states are constructing to confront the West. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting of defense ministers in Astana, Kazakhstan on April 26.[1] Shoigu met with PRC Minister of National Defense Dong Jun on the sidelines of the meeting and highlighted the “unprecedented” level of Russo-Sino relations.[2] Shoigu also met with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza Ashtiani and stated that Russia is prepared to expand Russo-Iranian military and military-technical cooperation.[3] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales and the Iranian defense industrial base, which makes these meetings particularly noteworthy. Dong and Ashtiani held a bilateral meeting and called for increased Sino-Iranian cooperation, including in the defense and military spheres.[4] Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin also met with Dong and Ashtiani at the SCO meeting on April 26.[5] The April 26 SCO meeting marked Iran’s first SCO meeting as a member state since joining the organization in July 2023.[6]

The SCO meetings are only the latest in a series of bilateral meetings between Russia, Belarus, the PRC, Iran, and North Korea. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative to the Russian President for Middle East and African Countries Mikhail Bogdanov met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani in Moscow on April 26.[7] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev met with PRC Communist Party Politburo member Chen Wenqing on April 23 in St. Petersburg and discussed strengthening cooperation between Russian and PRC intelligence services.[8] Patrushev also met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in St. Petersburg on April 24, and they signed a memorandum of understanding between the two countries’ security councils.[9] A North Korean delegation led by Minister for External Economic Relations Yun Jong Ho traveled to Iran on April 23.[10] Head of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Department of International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Revenko met with Iranian Deputy Minister of Defense and rector of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology Mehdi Jafari on April 22 in Minsk.[11] Although the details and results of these various bilateral meetings are unclear, the overt increase in their number and frequency is notable and demonstrates the group’s increased eagerness to publicly display its military and political cooperation in its competition and confrontation against the West.

The above text is featured in the Institute for the Study of War’s Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment published on April 26, 2024.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political and Political Affairs and chief nuclear negotiator Ali Bageri Kani met with Russian and Chinese officials in a BRICS meeting in Moscow, Russia on April 25. Bagheri Kani discussed the importance of bilateral ties and regional issues with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister for Middle East and North Africa Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov and PRC Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Zhai Jun.[12]

Western reporting has exaggerated how much Hamas has moderated its position toward Israel following an interview with a top Hamas official.[13] Western media reported that Khalil al Hayya, the deputy chairman of Hamas' Political Bureau, said during an interview on April 25 that Hamas is prepared to reach a truce of five or more years with Israel and implied that Hamas would turn into a political party and turn its military wing into “the national [Palestinian] army” if Israel recognizes a fully sovereign Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[14] Western reporting framed Hayya‘s statements to mean that Hamas‘ military wing would “dissolve“ if Israel recognized a fully sovereign Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[15] Hayya did not mention abandoning Hamas’ objective of destroying Israel, nor did he say that the new ”sovereign Palestinian state” would recognize Israel.

Hamas sees control over the Gaza Strip and West Bank as an interim step in the destruction of the Israeli state. Hayya’s interview is entirely consistent with this position. Hamas’ military wing’s website says that the group can “accept the interim liberation of parts of Palestine” and an “interim truce” but that these interim steps only “serve as a warrior’s rest stop.”[16] The same page adds that during this interim period, Hamas will not recognize Israel, and Hayya did not indicate that Hamas would do so.[17] A five-year truce would serve Hamas’ purposes by allowing the group to prepare for the next round of fighting. Hamas started the current war by breaking a period of relative calm between itself and Israel on October 6, and there is no reason to believe Hamas will honor a future “truce.”

Iran is attempting to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa by increasing its economic ties with non-Western partners. Iran likely aims to use these economic ties to circumvent sanctions. Iran held its second annual Iran-Africa Trade Summit in Tehran, Iran, on April 26. Iran’s Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade organized the event.[18] Iranian media reported that officials from over 30 African Union member states attended the summit.[19] It is unclear how many African Union member state officials attended the inaugural event in 2023. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi gave a speech at the summit stressing the need to strengthen trade between Iran and African nations.[20]

The Raisi administration has long sought to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa as part of its “neighborhood policy.”[21] Raisi focused his July 2023 trips to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—then marking the first Iranian presidential visit to Africa in 11 years—on improving economic ties with these countries.[22] Increased Iranian economic cooperation with African states will not enable the regime to fix the structural flaws in its economy, however. Greater bilateral trade with foreign countries would enable Iran to increase its capital inflows but will not solve the problems that cause Iran’s economic instability. Fundamental economic reforms—such as reducing the dominance of parastatal organizations in Iran’s economy and combatting corruption and nepotism—would be necessary to meaningfully improve Iran’s economy.[23]

Raisi held separate and private meetings about improving economic ties with Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga and Burkinabe Prime Minister Apollinaire J. Kyélem de Tambèla on the sidelines of the trade summit.[24] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and regime-affiliated outlets have previously encouraged increased economic engagement with Africa to obtain gold payments that Iran can use to evade sanctions.[25] Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe are among the top ten gold producers on the continent, making Raisi’s meetings with officials from these countries particularly noteworthy.[26] Israeli media reported that Zimbabwe signed a uranium deal with Iran in 2013, which Zimbabwe has since denied.[27]

Iran may seek to export arms to some African Union member states like Burkina Faso as part of its effort to improve ties with African states. Iranian officials have repeatedly expressed interest in using arms sales to generate revenue for the economy, particularly following Iran’s success in supplying Russia drones to use in Ukraine.[28] The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas could be amenable to such sales to combat the growing Salafi-jihadi threat in their countries. Weapons sales from Tehran could address their needs while aligning with their anti-Western and aggressively militarized counterinsurgency outlooks.[29] Iran has sent Ababil-3 multi-role and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021, setting a potential precedent for future shipments to the Sahel.[30] Turkey currently supplies drones to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. However, Burkina Faso has purchased Turkish drones as recently as April 8.[31]

Iran is facing an increasing threat from Salafi-jihadi groups in southeastern Iran. Iranian security forces conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle carrying “anti-Iran militants” roughly 60 kilometers southeast of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on April 25. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the strike killed two “terrorists” but provided no further details on the identity of the targeted individuals.[32] Iran’s use of drones to target these “terrorists” is exceptional, and the choice to use drones in this capacity suggests that Iran is facing an increasingly tenuous security environment in southeastern Iran. The strike follows the Balochi Salafi-jihadi group Jaish al Adl’s unprecedented attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on April 14. CTP previously noted that the April 14 attacks highlighted the uptick in anti-regime militancy and the increasingly precarious state of the Iranian internal security environment.

The US Department of Defense reported on April 26 that the United States began construction on a floating pier off the coast of the central Gaza Strip.[33] This US-constructed pier will serve as an additional route for humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The US Defense Department told the Wall Street Journal that the World Health Organization (WHO) will inspect the aid in Cyprus and commercial vessels will transfer the aid to the US-constructed floating pier.[34] US Army vessels will transport the aid from the floating pier to a temporary pier connected to the Gaza Strip by a causeway. Trucks from a “third country” will transport the aid from the temporary pier to distribution centers run by the United Nations and ”others.”[35] The BBC cited unspecified US officials who said that the US-constructed floating pier will be operational in early May.[36]

US Department of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder clarified that unidentified Palestinian fighters mortared the marshaling yard where humanitarian aid will be distributed.[37] CTP-ISW reported on April 25 that unspecified Palestinian fighters mortared construction facilities for the US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip. Israeli media reported that the mortars struck engineering equipment close to the pier.[38]

Egypt’s General Intelligence chief Abbas Kamel met with Israeli negotiators in Israel on April 26 to revive ceasefire negotiations. Israeli and Western media reported that Egyptian officials were pessimistic that an agreement could be reached. Israeli officials told the Egyptian delegation that Israel would agree to a hostage exchange that releases 33 hostages instead of the proposed 40 hostages under the US-backed ceasefire proposal.[39] Israel would agree to a ceasefire less than six weeks long in exchange. Israel believes that there are 33 civilian women, children, elderly, and wounded hostages being held in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has refused any hostage exchange agreement that does not include a permanent ceasefire, a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and the unimpeded return of displaced people to the northern Gaza Strip.[40] Hamas’ negotiating stance has not changed since December 2023.[41] The Wall Street Journal reported that the Egyptian delegation is hoping to use these ceasefire talks to “buy time” for the United States and regional states to pressure Israel to pause preparations for an operation into Rafah citing Egyptian officials “familiar with negotiations.”[42]

Key Takeaways:

  • China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Public meetings between officials from Russia, Belarus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea have surged in recent days, with at least 10 high-level bilateral meetings between April 22 and 26, underscoring the deepening multilateral partnership these states are constructing to confront the West.
  • Russian Defense Minister Shoigu also met with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza Ashtiani and stated that Russia is prepared to expand Russo-Iranian military and military-technical cooperation.[43] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales as well as the Iranian defense industrial base as defense minister, which makes these meetings particularly noteworthy.
  • Hamas: Western reporting has exaggerated how much Hamas has moderated its position toward Israel following an interview with a top Hamas official in which the Hamas official said Hamas would adhere to a five-year truce if Israel recognized a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Hamas sees control over the Gaza Strip and West Bank as an interim step in the destruction of the Israeli state and it views any truce with Israel as temporary.
  • Iran in Africa: Iran is attempting to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa by increasing its economic ties with non-Western partners. Iran likely aims to use these economic ties to circumvent sanctions. The IRGC has previously advocated obtaining access to gold in Africa to circumvent sanctions.
  • Southeastern Iran: Iran is facing an increasing threat from Salafi-jihadi groups in southeastern Iran. Iran used a drone to strike “terrorists” in southeastern Iran. Iran’s use of drones to target these “terrorists” is exceptional, and the choice to use drones in this capacity suggests that Iran is facing an increasingly tenuous security environment in southeastern Iran.
  • Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: US Department of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder clarified that unidentified Palestinian fighters mortared the marshaling yard where humanitarian aid will be distributed.
  • Negotiations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli and Western media Egyptian officials are pessimistic that an agreement could be reached between Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has not meaningfully changed its negotiating position since December 2023 and refuses to free the hostages it holds without a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip and a permanent ceasefire.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the Netzarim corridor.[44] The Netzarim corridor is where Israeli forces have established forward operating bases and outposts to facilitate future raids into the northern Gaza Strip.

 

 

The US State Department paused its earlier decision to restrict military aid to the Netzah Yehuda Battalion under the Leahy Law.[45] The Netzah Yehuda Battalion is an ultra-orthodox IDF unit that operates mostly in the West Bank. CBS News reported on April 26 that the State Department is reviewing ”additional information regarding the status of the [Netzah Yehuda Battalion]” from Israel and that there was no official determination on the possible Leahy Law violations.[46] Three US sources with knowledge of the issue told Axios on April 20 that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was planning to announce that the United States will ban US military assistance and training provided to the Netzah Yehuda Battalion under the 1997 Leahy Law. The Leahy Law makes it illegal for the US government to fund assistance for foreign security forces in which there is credible information that implicates a unit in the gross violation of human rights. Blinken reported that Israel did not effectively investigate the Netzah Yehuda Battalion for the accused violations.[47]

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement conducted one rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot on April 26.[48] This is the third consecutive day the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement has conducted rocket attacks into southern Israel.[49]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel 

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 25.[50] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces during Israeli operations in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[51]

The IDF detained five individuals across the West Bank on April 26.[52] The IDF also separately detained two individuals suspected of planning an attack on a farm in the central West Bank.[53] The IDF confiscated an axe and knives from the suspects.[54]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 25.[55]

Hezbollah said that it fired anti-tank guided missiles, rockets, and mortars targeting Israeli vehicles in Ruwaisat al Alam in Shebaa Farms on April 25.[56] The IDF reported that the attack killed an Israeli civilian.[57] This attack is one of the three attacks noted above.

The IDF conducted an airstrike on April 26 targeting a senior Jamaa al Islamiya member in the Western Bekaa district, roughly nine miles north of Shebaa farms.[58] The IDF airstrike occurred 19 hours after the Hezbollah attack targeting Shebaa Farms on April 25. The IDF said that the Jamaa al Islamiya commander was responsible for several attacks targeting Shebaa Farms and that he “cooperated” with Hamas in Lebanon.[59] Jamaa al Islamiya was founded in 1964 as the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.[60]

 

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Unspecified actors launched a one-way attack drone that killed four Yemeni nationals at the UAE-operated Khor Mor Gas field in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Iraq, on April 26.[61] The Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani condemned the attack and stated that the drone “came from a nearby region within Iraq.”[62] Barzani is probably referring to federal Iraq, which describes the areas outside the Kurdistan Region. Unspecified actors conducted drone and rocket attacks that briefly suspended gas production at Khor Mor in January 2024.[63]

The Houthis claimed that they attacked a Liberian-flagged merchant vessel MSC Darwin in the Gulf of Aden and separately launched ballistic missiles and drones targeting unspecified targets in Eilat, Israel, on April 25.[64] US CENTCOM reported that the Houthis launched one anti-ship ballistic missile into the Gulf of Aden but added that it did not damage any ships or cause any injuries.[65] CENTCOM forces destroyed one Houthi unmanned surface vessel and one Houthi unmanned aerial vehicle in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 25.[66] CTP-ISW did not observe any media reporting that corroborated the Houthi’s claimed ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting Eilat.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported an unspecified explosion and added that two missiles damaged a commercial vessel 14 nautical miles from al Mokha, Yemen, on April 26.[67] A Yemeni journalist reported that the Houthis launched a ballistic missile from near Taiz around the same time as the UKMTO report.[68]

 


[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/37931 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245763 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245816

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/37957 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37959 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37960

[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/37974 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37976

[4] https://dolat dot ir/detail/44608

[5] https://t.me/modmilby/38322 ; https://t.me/modmilby/38326

[6] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-sco-china-bri-illiberal-norms/#:~:text=The%20Islamic%20Republic%20of%20Iran's,as%20an%20observer%20in%202005.

[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/20657991

[8] https://iz dot ru/1686488/2024-04-23/patrushev-obsudil-s-chen-ventcinom-ukreplenie-sotrudnichestva-spetcsluzhb

[9] https://tass dot ru/politika/20640199

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korea-officials-visit-iran-rare-public-trip-2024-04-23/ ; https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-iran-diplomacy-military-cooperation-russia-f82461908cb59a15a634747e9ab48f6c

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2024

[12] https://nournews. dot ir/en/news/171254/BRICS-meeting-with-Iran-presence-kicks-off-in-Moscow ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/07/3075086 ; https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/sjxw_674887/202404/t20240426_11289897.shtml

[13] https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2024/04/25/israel-hamas-gaza-war/17bcb68c-034f-11ef-8eac-39c6dcb59eb5_story.html; https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/hamas-official-group-lay-weapons-state-solution-implemented-109605496

[14] https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438

[15] https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2024/04/25/israel-hamas-gaza-war/17bcb68c-034f-11ef-8eac-39c6dcb59eb5_story.html; https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/hamas-official-group-lay-weapons-state-solution-implemented-109605496; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-palestine-news-gaza-mass-graves-rafah-latest-b2535125.html#post-1604051

[16] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86

[17] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86

[18] https://president dot ir/fa/151482

[19] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/04/25/3074668

[20] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/07/3075107/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/04/26/3075236/; https://president dot ir/fa/151482  

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2023

[23] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-13-2023

[24] https://president dot ir/fa/151491 ; https://president dot ir/fa/151487

[25] http://fna dot ir/3dkxwz; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85165410; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/201267/Iran-s-gold-for-export-receipts-top-1mt-in-March-May; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/474374/Neighborhood-policy-neutralized-U-S-sanctions; https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-gcc-connectivity-agenda-implic...; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-14-2023

[26] https://www.independent.co dot ug/africas-10-largest-gold-producers/

[27] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/zimbabwes-mugabe-reportedly-signs-deal-to-sell-uranium-to-iran/

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-21-2023%C2%A0 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/irans-rise-as-global-arms-supplier-vexes-u-s-and-its-allies-6f205083 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85165410/%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%81%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%82%D8%A7

[29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-niger-cuts-the-united-states-for-russia-and-iran#_edn405f4000cab7ed5a0a82453b2915cb4721

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition

[31] https://twitter.com/AESinfos/status/1777649723161067793 ; https://twitter.com/fabsenbln/status/1777425142508904759

[32] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/04/26/3075176/

[33] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3756690/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68904209

[34] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-to-begin-construction-of-gaza-pier-as-rafah-invasion-looms-df1368b6?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2

[35] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-to-begin-construction-of-gaza-pier-as-rafah-invasion-looms-df1368b6?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2

[36] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68904209

[37] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3756690/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

[38] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-exclusive-u-s-humanitarian-pier-attacked-during-construction-work-off-gaza-coast

[39] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-may-not-have-enough-living-hostages-for-cease-fire-deal-61606c66?mod=article_inline ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/egypt-sends-negotiators-to-israel-fearing-time-is-running-out-for-rafah-91624dd4?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[40] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/51290 ; https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3756690/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2023

[42] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/egypt-sends-negotiators-to-israel-fearing-time-is-running-out-for-rafah-91624dd4?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/37974 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37976

[44] https://t.me/sarayaps/17700 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6325

[45] https://www.axios.com/2024/04/26/state-department-reviewing-plans-sanction-idf-unit

[46] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/blinken-israel-mike-johnson-leahy-act/

[47] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/blinken-israel-mike-johnson-leahy-act/

[48] https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4466 ;

[49] https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4462 ; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4458

[50] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6326; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6327; https://t.me/C_Military1/49402

[51] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6327

[52] https://www.idf dot il/194108

[53] https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1783793530101465341

[54] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1783792234996895813

[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/3536; https://t.me/mmirleb/3538; https://t.me/mmirleb/3542

[56] https://t.me/mmirleb/3538

[57] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1783750226035052596

[58] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1783905556161249372; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1783868358082924779

[59] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1783905556161249372

[60] https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62740

[61] https://twitter.com/RudawEnglish/status/1783933893139124325 ; https://twitter.com/SkyNewsArabia_B/status/1783932459475689899 ; https://twitter.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1783892893410714067 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosive-drone-strikes-iraqs-khor-mor-gas-field-sources-2024-01-25/

[62] https://twitter.com/masrourbarzani/status/1783949449946902977

[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosive-drone-strikes-iraqs-khor-mor-gas-field-sources-2024-01-25/ ; https://www.rudaw dot net/english/kurdistan/300120241

[64] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1783594833463910465; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/loud-bang-heard-smoke-seen-sea-southwest-yemens-aden-ukmto-reports-2024-04-25/

[65] https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1783803275160215868

[66] https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1783803275160215868

[67] https://twitter.com/UK_MTO/status/1783923371744366923 ; https://twitter.com/UK_MTO/status/1783887795699728606

[68] https://twitter.com/alsakaniali/status/1783903894567063756

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2024

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 26, 2024, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Western media continues to report that select US officials have resumed discussing the idea of “freezing the lines” where they are because the latest package of US military assistance to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all its territory.[1] Supporters of the current package have not claimed that it would by itself allow Ukraine to liberate all occupied territory, and the discussion of possible end states of the war is very premature as President Joe Biden signed the bill authorizing the new package only two days ago. US military assistance is currently en route to Ukraine and will take several weeks to arrive to frontline units and have tangible battlefield impacts.[2] Ukrainian forces will first have to leverage the incoming US aid to stabilize the frontlines and stop ongoing Russian advances, particularly in the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar directions, in the coming weeks. The scale and intensity of the forecasted Summer 2024 Russian offensive operation that will likely begin in June also remains unclear, and the Russian military command may be actively assessing and revising plans for its summer offensive effort to account for facing better-equipped Ukrainian forces.[3] Ukrainian forces will have to defend against the Russian summer offensive effort and prevent Russian forces from making operationally significant advances over the summer months before Ukrainian forces will be in a position to contest the theater-wide initiative and conduct a counteroffensive operation later in 2024 or 2025. Ukrainian forces must also address their ongoing manpower challenges through training new personnel, equipping new units, and reconstituting old units. The exact timeline for these efforts, which will likely play a significant role in determining the timeline for Ukraine‘s future counteroffensive operations, is unclear.[4] ISW continues to assess that sufficient and consistent Western aid will be critical for future Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts, although the US and the West will likely need to be responsive as the Ukrainian military command determines the scope and focus of such operations and relays Ukraine’s needs to Western partners in the weeks and months preceding future counteroffensive operations.[5] Ukraine’s ability to regain all of its territory in the long term rests on numerous future decisions in the West, in the Kremlin, and in Kyiv, and any discussions that treat the prospects of Ukrainian victory or defeat as predetermined outcomes ignore how all involved parties could dynamically alter the course of the war in Ukraine. 

Public meetings between officials from Russia, Belarus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea have surged in recent days, with at least 10 high-level bilateral meetings between April 22 and 26, underscoring the deepening multilateral partnership these states are constructing to confront the West. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting of defense ministers in Astana, Kazakhstan on April 26.[6] Shoigu met with PRC Minister of National Defense Dong Jun on the sidelines of the meeting and highlighted the “unprecedented” level of Russo-Sino relations.[7] Shoigu also met with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza Ashtiani and stated that Russia is prepared to expand Russo-Iranian military and military-technical cooperation.[8] Dong and Ashtiani held a bilateral meeting and called for increased Sino-Iranian cooperation, including in the defense and military spheres.[9] Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin also met with Dong and Ashtiani at the SCO meeting on April 26.[10] The April 26 SCO meeting marked Iran’s first SCO meeting as a member state since joining the organization in July 2023.[11]

The SCO meetings are only the latest in a series of bilateral meetings between Russia, Belarus, the PRC, Iran, and North Korea. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative to the Russian President for Middle East and African Countries Mikhail Bogdanov met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani in Moscow on April 26.[12] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev met with PRC Communist Party Politburo member Chen Wenqing on April 23 in St. Petersburg and discussed strengthening cooperation between Russian and PRC intelligence services.[13] Patrushev also met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in St. Petersburg on April 24, and they signed a memorandum of understanding between the two countries’ security councils.[14] A North Korean delegation led by Minister for External Economic Relations Yun Jong Ho traveled to Iran on April 23.[15] Head of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Department of International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Revenko met with Iranian Deputy Minister of Defense and rector of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology Mehdi Jafari on April 22 in Minsk.[16] Although the details and results of these various bilateral meetings are unclear, the overt increase in their number and frequency is notable and demonstrates the group’s increased eagerness to publicly display its military and political cooperation in its competition and confrontation against the West.

PRC officials claimed that NATO bears responsibility for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine amid meetings between PRC officials and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on April 26. Blinken met with PRC President Xi Jinping and stated that the PRC’s support for the Russian defense industry is enabling Russia’s war effort and undermining European and transatlantic security.[17] Blinken noted that the PRC is supplying Russia’s defense industry with machine tools, microelectronics, nitrocellulose (an intermediary good used in producing gunpowder and explosives), and other dual-use items and warned that the US is prepared to act if the PRC continues to support the Russian defense industry.[18] ISW has recently observed reports that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) continues to rely heavily on Chinese-produced machine tool components and electronics.[19] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated, likely in response to Blinken, that Russia imports more than 60 percent of weapons components and dual-use items from the US and other Western countries.[20] Wang added that NATO bears “unshirkable” responsibility for the ”Ukraine crisis“ and that the PRC continues to promote peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.[21] Wang’s statement is noticeably stronger than previous PRC statements about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that have portrayed the PRC as an objective and impartial mediator for future peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and Kremlin newswire TASS framed Wang’s statements as placing ”direct responsibility” for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on NATO.[22] The Kremlin will likely seize on stronger PRC rhetoric about the war in Ukraine to frame the PRC as supporting Russia’s objectives in Ukraine, as it has previously attempted to do.[23]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with immediate and longer-term military assistance, particularly for Ukraine’s air defenses. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on April 26 a new package of military assistance to Ukraine worth $6 billion as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).[24] The package includes Patriot air defense munitions, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) munitions, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) munitions, artillery ammunition, and equipment to integrate Ukrainian and Western air defense systems. The US DoD stated that the announcement marks the beginning of the “contracting process,” and the timeline of the production and delivery of these weapons is unclear at this time. Spanish outlet El Pais reported on April 26 that Spain will send a ”limited” number of Patriot missiles to Ukraine.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 26 at the Ramstein format meeting that Ukraine needs long-range weapons and air defense systems and reported that Russian forces have used more than 9,000 guided glide bombs against Ukraine since the start of 2024.[26] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin observed that the Patriot is not a silver bullet and that many factors will determine the course of the fighting.[27] No single weapons system is a silver bullet, to be sure, but the Patriot is one of the very few air defense systems able to engage Russian ballistic missiles and also to hit Russian fighter-bombers outside the range of Russian glide bombs. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s degraded air defense capabilities have allowed Russian aviation to heavily degrade Ukrainian defenses along the front with glide bomb strikes.[28] Zelensky stated that although Russian forces have seized the battlefield initiative in the past six months, Ukrainian forces will still be able to "not only stabilize the front but also advance.”[29]

The Ukrainian military has reportedly pulled US-provided M1A1 Abrams tanks from the frontline in part because of the widespread threat of Russian drones and other strikes. The Associated Press (AP) reported on April 26, citing two unspecified US military officials, that Ukraine has removed Abrams tanks from the frontline partly because Russia’s widespread drone usage has made it too difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate Abrams without Russian forces detecting and striking Abrams with drones.[30] Ukrainian drone operators recently told the Washington Post that the number of drones that both Russian and Ukrainian forces use has made the battlefield “almost transparent” given that up to 100 Russian and Ukrainian reconnaissance and attack drones can operate simultaneously within a 10-kilometer radius.[31] Any armored vehicles that Russian or Ukrainian forces may field on the frontline are visible to each other’s reconnaissance drones, so Ukrainian forces are likely prioritizing efforts to protect the limited number of Abrams tanks they currently possess. Any armored vehicles on the battlefield without active protection and counter-drone systems are highly vulnerable to enemy drone, artillery, and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) strikes. The Russian government has hyper-fixated on Russia’s ability to destroy Western-made weapon systems to posture Russian military equipment as superior to Western designs. Russia will soon open an exhibition of captured Western equipment in Moscow and has given military and monetary awards to Russian soldiers who destroyed Western armored vehicles.[32]

Russian authorities continue efforts to expand the definition of prosecutable anti-war sentiment to portray Russians who oppose the war in Ukraine as opposing Russia itself. The Russian Ministry of Justice appealed to the Russian Supreme Court on April 26 to recognize the alleged “Anti-Russian Separatist Movement” and its “structural divisions” as an extremist organization, which would allow Russian authorities to prosecute Russians for belonging, supporting, financing, or spreading the ideology of this movement.[33] Russian opposition media outlets largely responded to the appeal by noting that no such organization exists, and Russian authorities have previously designated other non-existent organizations meant to encompass broader “social movements” as “extremist.”[34] The Russian Ministry of Justice described the “Anti-Russian Separatist Movement” as an “international social movement [aiming] to destroy the multinational unity and territorial integrity of Russia,” indicating that Russian authorities likely intend to use this new extremist designation to further prosecute anti-war sentiment among Russians and within occupied Ukraine, particularly movements opposing Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and movements within ethnic minority communities advocating for better treatment of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel from these communities.[35] The “Anti-Russian Separatist Movement” extremist designation also sets informational conditions to further paint Russians who oppose the war or Russian imperialism as actually opposing the Kremlin and Russia itself.

Key Takeaways:

  • Western media continues to report that select US officials have resumed discussing the idea of “freezing the lines” where they are because the latest package of US military assistance to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all its territory. Supporters of the current package have not claimed that it would by itself allow Ukraine to liberate all occupied territory, and the discussion of possible end states of the war is very premature as President Joe Biden signed the bill authorizing the new package only two days ago.
  • Public meetings between officials from Russia, Belarus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea have surged in recent days, with at least 10 high-level bilateral meetings between April 22 and 26, underscoring the deepening multilateral partnership these states are constructing to confront the West.
  • PRC officials claimed that NATO bears responsibility for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine amid meetings between PRC officials and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on April 26.
  • Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with immediate and longer-term military assistance, particularly for Ukraine’s air defenses.
  • The Ukrainian military has reportedly pulled US-provided M1A1 Abrams tanks from the frontline in part because of the widespread threat of Russian drones and other strikes.
  • Russian authorities continue efforts to expand the definition of prosecutable anti-war sentiment to portray Russians who oppose the war in Ukraine as opposing Russia itself.
  • Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance northwest of Avdiivka, and Ukrainian forces made a confirmed advance in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, although this advance was likely not recent.
  • Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Tatar-Bashkort service Idel Realii reported on April 26 that Samara Oblast is forming a new “Batyr” volunteer motorized rifle battalion.
  • The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) issued a joint statement on behalf of 45 member states stating that Russia has arbitrarily detained thousands of Ukrainian civilians in occupied Ukraine and subjected them to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 26 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued southeast of Kupyansk near Kyslivka and Berestove; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Zarichne, and Torske; southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny and Yampolivka, but ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on April 26 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Positional fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, south of Siversk near Mykolaivka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne.[38] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on April 26 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting occurred northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka, near the Novyi and Kanal microraions in eastern Chasiv Yar, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, southeast of Chasiv Yar near the Stupky-Holubovskyi nature reserve and Klishchiivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Shumy.[40] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on April 26 that Russian forces are attacking Bohdanivka, Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) in an effort to bypass Chasiv Yar and set conditions to operationally encircle and seize the settlement.[41] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are concentrating efforts on breaking through Ukrainian defenses east of Chasiv Yar, crossing the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal, seizing Chasiv Yar, and creating conditions for subsequent drives on the Kramatorsk agglomeration (the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostyantynivka fortress belt).[42] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces have concentrated slightly more personnel near Klishchiivka and attacked heavily near Bila Hora (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on April 25.[43] Voloshyn added that Russian forces in the Bila Hora area are regrouping, accumulating ammunition, and actively demining the frontline.[44] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on Chasiv Yar’s eastern outskirts.[45]

Russian forces recently made additional tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka and reportedly advanced further in the area as of April 26. Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal advances within central Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) and in central Semenivka (west of Avdiivka).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) and up to a kilometer west of the settlement along the O-0544 (Ocheretyne-Hrodivka) highway; north, west, and south of Novobakhmutivka (northwest of Avdiivka), and north of Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka).[47] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized the remainder of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and advanced in fields northwest of the settlement after Ukrainian forces withdrew from Berdychi.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the remainder of Semenivka, although Russian sources have previously claimed that Russian forces have seized the settlement.[49] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any of these Russian claims. Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian forces currently control two-thirds of Ocheretyne and are preventing Russian forces from making further advances in the area.[50] Select Russian milbloggers claimed on April 25 and 26 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Ocheretyne to Arkhanhelske (northeast of Ocheretyne and northwest of Avdiivka), although others claimed that Ukrainian forces retain positions in northwestern Ocheretyne.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian assault groups temporarily reached the outskirts of Arkhanhelske and argued that this indicates that Ukrainian forces likely do not have strong fortifications between Ocheretyne and Arkhanhelske.[52] Fighting also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Keramik, west of Avdiivka near Umanske, and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove and Nevelske.[53] Elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Ocheretyne, and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Semenivka.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on April 26 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields east of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and broke through Ukrainian defenses within Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[55] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Vodyane.[56] A Russian milblogger amplified footage showing Russian forces conducting a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault within Krasnohorivka reportedly on April 24.[57]

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 26. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 200 meters in depth near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[58] Positional fighting occurred southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Prechystivka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[59] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City).[60]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of this claim.[61] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently intensified shelling and drone strikes against Russian positions in the area.[63] Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[64]

 

Russian forces marginally advanced in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements in the area on April 26. Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced within Krynky, although the advance is likely not recent.[65] Positional engagements continued near Krynky and the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky).[66]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces reportedly conducted limited strikes against Ukrainian railway and industrial infrastructure on April 26. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a train transporting Western weapons and military equipment near Udachne, Donetsk Oblast.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also struck an industrial enterprise in Sumy City.[68]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated on April 26 that Russian forces are using Su-57 fighter aircraft to launch missiles at Ukraine and are operating the aircraft far from frontline areas to avoid limited Ukrainian air defense systems downing the aircraft.[69] Yevlash noted that Russian forces can use Su-57 aircraft to launch Kh-69 cruise missiles.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Tatar-Bashkort service Idel Realii reported on April 26 that Samara Oblast is forming a new “Batyr” volunteer motorized rifle battalion.[70] Idel Realii reported that the battalion intends to recruit largely from Tatarstan residents in May-June 2024 and plans to recruit 400 personnel. The personnel who sign contracts to serve in the “Batyr” battalion will reportedly receive a 405,000 ruble ($4,406) payment from Samara Oblast and a 195,000 ruble ($2,121) payment from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Republic of Tatarstan government is reportedly helping finance and provision the battalion.

Russian military personnel, particularly penal recruits, continue to commit crimes upon returning to Russia from Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on April 25 that Russian military personnel who fought in Ukraine and returned to Russia have killed 107 people, including 76 people across 55 cases of murder; and wounded an additional 100 people through attempted murder, assault, and car accidents.[71] Verstka reported that most of the murderers were penal colony recruits, including Wagner Group penal colony recruits.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Telegram channel of the Russian 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Territorial Troops [TRV]) posted footage on April 26 purportedly of Russian forces using ropes and hooks to retrieve downed drones from minefields to avoid personnel losses.[72] Elements of the 1430th Regiment are reportedly operating near Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[73]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) issued a joint statement on behalf of 45 member states stating that Russia has arbitrarily detained thousands of Ukrainian civilians in occupied Ukraine and subjected them to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.[74] The OSCE noted that Russian authorities in Ukraine have conducted systematic torture of Ukrainians, conducted extrajudicial killings, and failed to investigate those killings. The OSCE reported that Russian authorities used cruel forms of punishment such as sexual violence, and kept detained Ukrainians in harsh conditions, including depriving them of contact with the outside world. The OSCE noted that Ukrainian detainees have reported receiving punishments for speaking Ukrainian or for other expressions of Ukrainian identity and culture. The OSCE explicitly concluded that “extrajudicial killings” of Ukrainian civilian detainees” and the failure to investigate these killings “constitute serious violations” of international human rights law and “may amount to a war crime and crime against humanity.”

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to Russify Ukrainian youth through forced deportations and other measures in occupied Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on April 25 that Kremlin Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova opened a center in Penza Oblast for disabled individuals and that Russian authorities transferred four disabled Ukrainians from occupied Ukraine to the Penza center in November 2023.[75] Vazhnye Istorii noted that Russian authorities are not discussing the return of these Ukrainians to Ukraine.[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 24 that Russian occupation officials have ordered libraries in occupied Crimea to remove materials featuring pro-Ukraine sentiments and symbology, information about the Holodomor genocide, and information about Crimean Tatar activities.[77] The Resistance Center reported on April 25 that occupation officials continue militarizing Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine and will begin teaching schoolchildren how to operate drones in the new school year on September 1, 2024.[78]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to restore some logistics infrastructure and mineral extraction facilities while struggling with labor shortages in occupied Ukraine. Kherson Oblast occupation government chairperson Andrei Alekseyenko stated on April 24 that Russian authorities intend to completely reconstruct the Askania Nova-Chaplynka highway, which connects the western and eastern halves of occupied Kherson Oblast and serves as an alternate route to occupied Crimea, before the start of summer 2024.[79] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 25 that Russian authorities are auditing a final 33 mines in occupied Luhansk Oblast to determine if the mines are profitable enough to continue maintaining.[80] The Resistance Center noted that Russia has previously deemed almost 100 mines of 114 assessed as unprofitable and that Russian authorities coerced 60 percent of mine workers to serve in the Russian military.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials are trying to deflect blame from the Russian military’s use of chemical weapons in Ukraine by claiming that the US is supporting the Ukrainian military’s alleged use of chemical weapons. Russian Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Vladimir Tarabrin, claimed on April 26 that the US and its allies are shielding Ukraine’s use of chemical weapons.[81] A Telegraph investigation published in April found that Russian forces continue to systematically use prohibited chemical weapons in Ukraine and are attacking Ukrainian positions with chemical substances almost daily throughout the frontline.[82] The Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) acknowledged in a now-deleted post that elements of the brigade deliberately used K-51 grenades with CS gas on Ukrainian positions near Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast in December 2023.[83] CS gas is a riot control agent (RCA) prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.[84]

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova blamed the US and NATO for allegedly threatening nuclear escalation with Russia and claimed that Russia has warned the West about the “catastrophic” consequences of such escalation, likely in an attempt to posture against Polish President Andrzej Duda’s April 22 statement that Poland is ready to host NATO’s nuclear weapons.[85] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on April 23 that NATO is not planning to deploy any more nuclear weapons to any additional NATO countries.[86]

Zakharova insinuated that Ukraine is endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), likely in an attempt to shift blame away from Russia’s two-year occupation and militarization of the ZNPP.[87] Russian forces have endangered the ZNPP by storing military equipment including ammunition, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, and other armaments on ZNPP grounds.[88]

Armenian Ambassador to the European Union (EU) Tigran Balayan stated that Armenia is considering blocking more Russian state television programs from Armenian broadcasting to combat Russian information operations attempting to undermine Armenia’s sovereignty. Balayan stated in an interview with the Moscow Times published on April 24 that Russian media is attempting to promote negative views of Armenian leadership and questioning “the very idea of Armenia being an independent state.”[89] Prominent Russian propagandists, including RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan, Tigran Keosayan, Vladimir Solovyov, and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, have routinely criticized Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and claimed that he and the Armenian government are ceding Armenian sovereignty to Azerbaijan.[90] Balayan stated that Russian state television broadcasts in Armenia do not have a strong effect on Armenian public option but can impact those who are native Russian speakers and are accustomed to watching Russian state television.[91] Armenian Minister of High-Technology Industry Mkhitar Hayrapetyan stated on April 10 that Armenia is considering terminating an agreement with Russia that allows Russia to broadcast Russian state television programs in Armenia following the March 29 announcement that Armenia blocked two of Solovyov’s shows.[92]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024 ; https://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/04/25/americas-61bn-aid-package-buys-ukraine-time

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042024

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041824

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042524

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/37931 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245763 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245816

[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/37957 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37959 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37960

[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/37974 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37976

[9] https://dolat dot ir/detail/44608

[10] https://t.me/modmilby/38322 ; https://t.me/modmilby/38326

[11] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-sco-china-bri-illiberal-norms/#:~:text=The%20Islamic%20Republic%20of%20Iran's,as%20an%20observer%20in%202005.

[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/20657991

[13] https://iz dot ru/1686488/2024-04-23/patrushev-obsudil-s-chen-ventcinom-ukreplenie-sotrudnichestva-spetcsluzhb

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/20640199

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korea-officials-visit-iran-rare-public-trip-2024-04-23/ ; https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-iran-diplomacy-military-cooperation-russia-f82461908cb59a15a634747e9ab48f6c

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2024

[17] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/antony-blinken-xi-jinping-china-warns-us-downward-spiral-rcna149486 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/blinken-meets-with-xi-as-u-s-pressures-china-to-end-support-for-russia-96e831e0 ; https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

[18] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/antony-blinken-xi-jinping-china-warns-us-downward-spiral-rcna149486 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/blinken-meets-with-xi-as-u-s-pressures-china-to-end-support-for-russia-96e831e0 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/blinken-meet-chinese-counterpart-wang-yi-beijing-2024-04-26/

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024

[20] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202404/t20240426_11289998.html ; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20658829

[21] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202404/t20240426_11289998.html

[22] https://t.me/tass_agency/245825 ; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20658829 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2024

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824

[24] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3757794/biden-administration-announces-historic-new-security-assistance-package-for-ukr/

[25] https://elpais dot com/internacional/2024-04-26/espana-suministrara-una-partida-de-misiles-patriot-a-ucrania.html?event_log=oklogin

[26] https://www.eurointegration dot com.ua/news/2024/04/26/7184731/ ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2024/04/26/7453164/

[27] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3758232/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-and-air-force-general-charles-q-brown-j/

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2024

[29] https://www.eurointegration dot com.ua/news/2024/04/26/7184731/ ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2024/04/26/7453164/

[30] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-abrams-tanks-19d71475d427875653a2130063a8fb7a

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2024

[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/245822 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245845 ; https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/5781678/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-business-offers-cash-bounties-destroy-western-tanks-ukraine-2023-01-30/  

[33] https://ria dot ru/20240426/minyust-1942460885.html ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/04/2024/662b70839a7947eddc4c88a9

[34] https://t.me/idelrealii/35122 ; https://t.me/severrealii/24631; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/04/26/minyust-potreboval-priznat-ekstremistskoy-organizatsiey-antirossiyskoe-separatistskoe-dvizhenie-ranee-o-nem-ne-bylo-izvestno; https://istories dot media/stories/2024/04/26/zakon-o-dekolonialistakh/;

[35] https://istories dot media/stories/2024/04/26/zakon-o-dekolonialistakh/; https://ria dot ru/20240426/minyust-1942460885.html ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/04/2024/662b70839a7947eddc4c88a9; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/04/26/minyust-potreboval-priznat-ekstremistskoy-organizatsiey-antirossiyskoe-separatistskoe-dvizhenie-ranee-o-nem-ne-bylo-izvestno

[36] https://t.me/synegubov/9220 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Nk4vXV1ybr9vP2pJcbycpbToRPZkVzf6KMLc2SMXNdR1YsKPPStvMxkQsgbEoNoBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37971 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/18448 ;

[37] https://t.me/motopatriot/22076

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Nk4vXV1ybr9vP2pJcbycpbToRPZkVzf6KMLc2SMXNdR1YsKPPStvMxkQsgbEoNoBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66925 (Siversk direction)

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/19584 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22061 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14289 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40906 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Nk4vXV1ybr9vP2pJcbycpbToRPZkVzf6KMLc2SMXNdR1YsKPPStvMxkQsgbEoNoBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37971

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/26/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-najgaryachishi-tochky-bilya-chasovogo-yaru/

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/26/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-najgaryachishi-tochky-bilya-chasovogo-yaru/

[43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/26/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-najgaryachishi-tochky-bilya-chasovogo-yaru/

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/26/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-najgaryachishi-tochky-bilya-chasovogo-yaru/

[45] https://t.me/rusich_army/14289

[46] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/24333; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5264 ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1783863552773607558; https://twitter.com/Shtirlitz53/status/1783809320221655044

[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26611; https://t.me/motopatriot/22060; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121507; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26615 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55812

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot/22063; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121548  ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22100 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245853

[49] https://t.me/notes_veterans/16790 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22084 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22086

[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/26/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-boyi-v-ocheretynomu/ ;

[51] https://t.me/rybar/59508 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40906 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19584 ;  https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121466 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/4778 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121463

[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121466

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37971 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37971 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40906 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19584 ;

[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66914 ; https://t.me/sashakots/46336; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/24333 (Semenivka) ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/26/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-boyi-v-ocheretynomu/ (Ocheretyne)

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26618

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Nk4vXV1ybr9vP2pJcbycpbToRPZkVzf6KMLc2SMXNdR1YsKPPStvMxkQsgbEoNoBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245784 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40906 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19584  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55812 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10012

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121468

[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/8143

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Nk4vXV1ybr9vP2pJcbycpbToRPZkVzf6KMLc2SMXNdR1YsKPPStvMxkQsgbEoNoBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl

[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/37982 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10497 (Vuhledar)

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot/22102

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Nk4vXV1ybr9vP2pJcbycpbToRPZkVzf6KMLc2SMXNdR1YsKPPStvMxkQsgbEoNoBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8660 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40906 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9971 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9984 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19584

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9996 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9984 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40923 ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/5719

[64] https://t.me/grey_zone/22991

[65] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14183

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F5UPfCbJmxH5UDH8XaG8UfvyRpsS7VeUptD8TWicUBGu47LpoMUixjeCxBsmKEGPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Nk4vXV1ybr9vP2pJcbycpbToRPZkVzf6KMLc2SMXNdR1YsKPPStvMxkQsgbEoNoBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3oFTrEA99ZseRKk2LtVq6VzMbktnknKpZZcgTeBzzk4CZzaF1azAPB6XjfJdJFzl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8660 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40906

[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/245861 ; https://t.me/sashakots/46328

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9994; https://t.me/astrapress/54129

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/26/illya-yevlash-pro-litak-su-57-cze-duzhe-doroge-bryazkalcze-yake-vony-berezhut-vid-zbyttya/

[70] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-tatarstane-sformiruyut-novyy-imennoy-batalon/32921872.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/35127

[71] https://verstka dot media/issledovanie_kak_uchastniki_voini_v_ukraine_vernulis_i_prodolzhayut_ubivat_i_kalechit

[72] https://t.me/motopatriot/22105 ; https://t.me/polk_1430/4504

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024

[74] https://osce.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-report-of-the-moscow-mechanism-to-address-the-arbitrary-detention-of-ukrainian-civilians-by-the-russian-federation/

[75] https://t.me/istories_media/6163

[76] https://t.me/istories_media/6163

[77] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/ubrat-golodomor-upa-i-dzhemilova-z-bibliotek-krymu/

[78] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/u-shkolah-na-tot-okupanty-gotuvatymut-operatoriv-bpla/

[79] https://t.me/aakherson/1396

[80] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/okupanty-puskayut-pid-nizh-ukrayinski-shahty/

[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/245863

[82] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2024

[83] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2023

[84] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040724

[85] https://t.me/MID_Russia/39068 ; https://www.politico dot eu/article/poland-ready-host-nuclear-weapons-andrzej-duda-nato/

[86] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_224943.htm

[87] https://t.me/MID_Russia/39068

[88] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2023

[89] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/04/24/armeniya-predupredila-o-novih-zapretah-na-programmi-rossiiskoi-propagandi-a128989

[90] https://t.me/rybar/59528 ; https://t.me/rybar/59511 ; https://t.me/rybar/59071 ; https://t.me/rybar/59090 ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32655377.html ; https://analitik dot am/news/view/680694 ; https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/04/24/armeniya-predupredila-o-novih-zapretah-na-programmi-rossiiskoi-propagandi-a128989 ; https://www.panorama dot am/ru/news/2024/04/01/%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%81-%D0%90%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8/2984002 ; https://panorama dot pub/news/margarita-simonan-obavila-o-svoem

[91] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/04/24/armeniya-predupredila-o-novih-zapretah-na-programmi-rossiiskoi-propagandi-a128989

[92] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024